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Abstract
Background: Few studies have considered in detail the range of biosecurity practices undertaken on cattle farms,
particularly within the UK. In this study, 56 cattle farmers in a 100 km2 area of north-west England were questioned
regarding their on-farm biosecurity practices, including those relating to animal movements, equipment sharing and
companies and contractors visiting the farms.
Methodology/Principal Findings: There was great variation between farms in terms of the type of, and extent to which,
biosecurity was carried out. For example, the majority of farmers did not isolate stock bought onto the farm, but a small
proportion always isolated stock. Many farmers administered treatments post-movement, primarily vaccinations and
anthelmintics, but very few farms reported carrying out any health checks after moving animals on. In addition, there
appeared to be much variation in the amount of biosecurity carried out by the different companies and contractors visiting
the farms. Deadstock collectors and contracted animal waste spreaders, although likely to have a high potential for contact
with infectious agents, were reported to infrequently disinfect themselves and their vehicles.
Conclusions/Significance: These findings suggest that although certain biosecurity practices are undertaken, many are
carried out infrequently or not at all. This may be due to many factors, including cost (in time and money), lack of proven
efficacies of practices and lack of relevant education of veterinary surgeons, producers and other herd health specialists.
Further research exploring the reasons for the lack of uptake is imperative if preventive medicine is to be utilised fully by the
farming industry.
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Introduction
The term biosecurity has been defined in several ways. Frequently
its scope is limited to ‘management systems that reduce the risk of
introducing infectious disease to a herd’ [1] (i.e. external
biosecurity). Management practices, including those affecting
animal contacts within farms, may also affect disease spread
between different animal management groups (i.e. internal
biosecurity); despite the potential for impact on many diseases,
in some cases this has been seen only as a backup system when
between-farm systems have failed [2]. Although preventive
techniques have been used for centuries to protect animals from
disease [3], the term biosecurity came to the forefront of animal
health in the UK during the foot and mouth disease (FMD)
outbreak in 2001 [4,5]. The continued association between FMD
and biosecurity may affect the way many people interpret, and
react to the term.
The putative benefits of undertaking biosecurity for disease
prevention and/or control include improved production efficiency
resulting in greater profits [6,7,8,9], better animal welfare [10],
improved immune responses to vaccines [3] and enhanced job
satisfaction for producers, herd health professionals and other
agricultural workers [11]. There exist recommendations for a wide
range of biosecurity practices for the major livestock production
systems, either for general disease prevention, or to minimise
specific infection risks, including zoonotic risks. A number of
studies have recommended biosecurity practices for cattle
[2,3,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21], sheep [22,23,24], pig [25,26,
27], poultry [28], alpaca [29] and fish [30] production systems.
Whilst many of these studies advise the use of preventive
procedures, they do not often provide evidence on the efficacies
or cost-effectiveness of engaging in such practices. The few studies
that do offer evidence of efficacy usually consider a single practice,
such as disinfectant footbaths [31,32], or look at the prevention of
one disease only [33]. The considerable variation in recommen-
dations between publications may lead to confusion amongst
producers, resulting in them undertaking less appropriate
practices. They may select practices that are ‘favoured’, or easy
to implement, which may not be the most effective for that
holding. [34].
Although some information exists for the UK [35], Sweden [36]
and the USA [37,38], there is generally little published data on the
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current use of preventive practices on cattle holdings. In order to
optimise the use of preventive tools, it is important to understand
first if and how they are being used. This can help to identify areas
for further exploration, such as evidence-based research on the
efficacy and cost-effectiveness of undertaking such practices. In
addition, this knowledge is useful for investigation of other factors
affecting producer decision-making related to biosecurity, such as
sociological factors. This could assist producers and herd health
advisors in deciding the most effective areas to invest in and could
highlight areas requiring further producer/vet education and
training. By investigating current behaviours ‘locally’, it is possible
for regionally appropriate research to be undertaken or targeted
education programs to be carried out, perhaps increasing the
effectiveness of disease control and surveillance in an area.
The aim of this study, therefore, was to identify the biosecurity
practices undertaken by cattle producers to prevent disease
transmission within and between farms in a region.
Materials and Methods
Cattle farmers within a 100 km2 area of north-west England
were invited to participate in a cross-sectional study investigating
contacts between cattle farms and any associated biosecurity
practices undertaken. This study was part of a 3-tier research
initiative which also investigated contacts between cattle herds on
a national level [39] and a within-herd level [40].
All cattle farmers within this 100 km2 area were contacted via
mail and given background information about the study. A follow
up phone call, or visit to the farm if phone numbers were not
available, determined whether farmers were willing to participate.
As previously reported [41], from a total of 81 farmers that were
approached, 56 farmers agreed to participate. Seven farms did not
have cattle or were no longer trading livestock and 3 were shortly
to cease trading. Thirteen farmers declined to participate, and 2
could not be contacted despite several attempts or could not make
an appointment during the allotted data collection time. Therefore
of the 71 farms currently trading cattle at normal capacity, 79%
agreed to participate in the study and the results reported here
relate to information elicited from these 56 farmers. Further details
on the non-responders have been described previously [41]. The
majority of farms visited were dairy farms (36 farms), with the
remaining farms being fat-stock farms (19), suckler herds (15), store
animal herds (8) and pedigree breeders (3) (farms could have more
than one cattle enterprise). The median number of cattle per farm
was 170 (Interquartile range (IQR) 104–320) and the median size
of each farm was 80.3 hectares (IQR 48–137). The majority of
farms (55) were family run businesses.
An interview-based questionnaire was designed to collect
information from farmers or managers during visits to each of
the 56 farms. This questionnaire can be found in Appendix S1. A
pilot study involving 6 cattle farms outside of the study area was
conducted prior to the commencement of the main study, and
minor changes made to the questionnaire. The study data were
collected between July and September 2005. The questionnaire
was administered by the first author during face-to-face interviews
and contained 191 questions; only those questions relevant to each
individual farm were asked (e.g. if a farm exclusively ran a suckler
enterprise, questions relating to visits by milk collectors were
excluded). A selection of both closed and open questions were
asked. Questions relating to contacts between the farms were
included; these have been discussed in a previous publication [41].
Questions were also asked in relation to selected biosecurity
practices; these practices were identified after review of the
available literature. This information was gathered from peer-
reviewed papers, government reports and advice sheets, and grey
literature (non-conventional literature).
The practices selected related to activities surrounding animal
movements, including the transport vehicles that were used and
the isolation or treatment regimes undertaken after animals had
moved onto a farm. Any biosecurity that was performed by
producers relating to equipment sharing (the temporary lending
and borrowing of equipment) between farms and any preventive
measures undertaken by visiting company and contractor
representatives were also examined. Additionally, behaviours
surrounding waste disposal and permitting animal access to
watercourses (streams, rivers etc.) were also explored. Practices
relating to the reduction of within-farm transmission of pathogens
were also investigated, particularly those related to housing,
personnel and on-farm vehicles.
In this study, the term ‘imported’ refers to animals brought into
the UK from another country. The term ‘shows’, ‘showed’ or
‘showing’ refers to animals taken to an agricultural event for
judging. ‘Markets’ relate to animals being bought and sold at a
livestock market. ‘Sales’ refers to animals being sold on a seasonal
basis (e.g. bull sales) or as part of a cessation of trading event and
can occur at various locations (e.g. market yards, farms). The
expression ‘cleaning and disinfection’ in relation to personnel
refers to individuals washing their outer protective clothing
(including footwear) with water and/or disinfectant. The term
‘muck’ describes manure or faecal material from cattle, which in
the UK is often collected and spread onto fields (‘muck spreading’).
Descriptive analyses were conducted in Microsoft Excel
(Microsoft 2003). Univariable analyses were performed using
Minitab Release 14.1 (Minitab Inc.) and SPSS 12.0.1 for Windows
(SPSS Inc.). Fisher’s Exact tests were used to investigate differences
between the isolation of stock following introduction to the farm
from different sources and whether access of stock to watercourses
was affected by whether or not the watercourse traversed farmland
upstream.
The study was conducted in accordance with the research ethics
requirements of the Faculty of Veterinary Science at the
University of Liverpool. Informed verbal consent was obtained
from all participants involved in the study during initial phone calls
or visits. Informed verbal consent was again obtained in person at
the beginning of each interview and it was made clear to
participants that by agreeing to be interviewed, they were agreeing
to be part of the study.
Results
Preventing disease transmission between farms via direct
contact
Risk associated with animal movements can be reduced by
producers only purchasing animals from farms with a known
disease history and through isolation, disease testing and
prophylactic treatment of purchased stock. The proportion of
farms reporting such measures in this study varied between the
type of biosecurity practice and also by the origin of the animals
pre-movement.
Of the 33 farmers that purchased stock directly from other
farms, 70% (n= 23) reported that they inquired about the disease
history of the vendor farm prior to purchase. Farmers indicated
that the diseases of most concern were bovine viral diarrhoea
(BVD; 57%, n=13), bovine tuberculosis (bTB; 52%, n= 12),
leptospirosis (43%, n= 10), infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR;
26%, n= 6) and various respiratory conditions (17%, n= 4).
Interestingly, 2 farmers (9%) nominated FMD, with only 1 farmer
each nominating mastitis, Salmonella spp. and Johne’s disease.
Biosecurity on Cattle Farms in a Region
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Most farmers did not isolate animals moved on from another
farm, a market, a dealer or a sale (Figure 1). Few farms imported
(n = 3) or showed (n= 1) animals. There were no significant
associations between the various trading sources of animals and
whether farmers ‘always’ or ‘never’ isolated stock on farm entry
(Fishers Exact P-values 0.7–1).
Farmers that imported animals and moved animals on from
sales appeared to keep them in isolation for longer than those
moving from other farms, markets, dealers and shows, although
there was considerable variation (Figure 2). Six farms isolated stock
moved on from some sources and not others. Re-analysis
excluding these 6 farms indicated that animals from markets
tended to be isolated for the longest period of time (median 32
days), followed by animals from sales (median 12 days), from other
farms and dealers (median 7 days for both) and from shows
(median 4 days).
Treatment of stock post-movement was performed by more
farms than were health checks or disease testing. The most
common intervention was vaccination, followed by anthelmintic
administration (Figure 3). The most common vaccines used were
for protection against BVD and leptospirosis, followed by IBR and
Salmonella spp. (Figure 4). Only 7 farms reported carrying out
health checks after moving animals on; these related primarily to
determining somatic cells counts in milk (n = 3) and blood tests for
both BVDV and Leptospira (n = 3).
Preventing disease transmission between farms via
indirect contact (fomites: equipment, vehicles and
personnel)
There was great variation between farms, and between
companies and contractors in terms of whether vehicle and
personnel biosecurity was carried out, or was seen to be carried
out. Approximately 78% (n= 39) of the 50 producers trading
through markets used their own vehicle for transporting animals,
followed by 71% (n= 29) of the 41 producers trading with other
farms, 39% (n= 11) of the 28 producers taking animals to
slaughterhouses and 33% (n= 4) of the 12 producers buying or
selling stock at sales. Only 7% (n= 2) of producers trading through
dealers used their own vehicles to move animals for this purpose.
A list of the types of equipment shared between farms can be
seen in Appendix S2. As previously reported in Brennan et al.
[41], of the producers that shared equipment with other farmers
(n = 24), 12 performed biosecurity on items before or after using
Figure 1. Number of farmers isolating stock after moving them
onto the farm from various sources out of 56 farmers
interviewed in a 100 km2 area of north-west England.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028139.g001
Figure 2. Violin plot of the number of days animals were
isolated for after moving them onto the farm from various
sources. Violin plots comprise a box-and-whiskers plot com-
bined with a kernel density smooth to highlight the underlying
frequency distribution of the data. Data are taken from
interviews conducted with 56 farmers in a 100 km2 area of
north-west England.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028139.g002
Figure 3. Number of farmers undertaking preventive measures
on animals arriving onto the farm from various sources out of
56 farmers interviewed in a 100 km2 area of north-west
England.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028139.g003
Biosecurity on Cattle Farms in a Region
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them and 12 (50%) did not. Of the 5 farmers that lent items, 2
would clean items on their return, 2 would clean items prior to
lending them and 1 farmer did both. Of the 8 farmers that
borrowed items, 5 would clean the equipment prior to their return
(1 farmer cleaned only one out of three items borrowed) and 2
would clean items prior to their use; 1 farmer did both. One
farmer was included twice as they both lent and borrowed
equipment (n = 13).
Overall, 28% (n= 215) of companies and contractors reportedly
parked in animal areas (areas where animals had access to or were
situated) and of these, most (89.8%; n= 193) never cleaned their
vehicles after visiting farms (Table 1). As mentioned in Brennan et
al. [41], those companies reported to be most likely to park in
animal areas were hoof trimmers (94%, n= 17), muck spreaders
(71%, n= 30) and deadstock collectors (47%, n= 26). The most
likely companies to always clean vehicles after parking in animal
areas were hoof trimmers (53%, n= 9), followed by muck
spreaders (17%, n= 5) and milk companies (14%, n= 1). However,
when focusing only on those organisations most likely to park
vehicles in animal areas, deadstock collectors always cleaned their
vehicles only 4% (n= 1) of the time.
Marginally more company and contractor personnel were
reported to have contact with animals or animal areas (34%;
n= 262) than vehicular contact with animal areas (28%; n= 215)
(Table 1). However, the overall rate of company/contractor
personnel reported to always clean and disinfect after coming into
contact with animals or animal areas was 62% (n= 163), much
greater than the value seen for the undertaking of vehicular
biosecurity (8.8%, n= 19). Muck spreaders (n = 10) and hedge
trimmers (n = 1) were reported to never undertake biosecurity
(100%). Private veterinarians (100%; n= 56), deadstock collectors
(93%; n= 51) and farm assurance advisors (85%; n= 39) had the
largest number of personnel entering animal areas, as previously
stated in Brennan et al. [41]. Private veterinarians were reported
to always clean and disinfect themselves after visits 96% (n= 54) of
the time, deadstock collectors 4% (n= 2) of the time and farm
assurance advisors 90% (n= 35) of the time.
Only 36% of the 56 farms (n = 20) had regular routine
veterinary visits occurring at a median of 26 times a year (IQR
13–26). Seventy three percent (n = 41) recorded herd health
information about their animals, including any diagnoses made
and any results from tests or surveys.
Preventing disease transmission between farms via
indirect contact (environment)
Risks associated with environmental transmission of pathogens
can be reduced by preventing grazing of pastures recently spread
with animal waste and preventing cattle access to common
waterways. Almost all of the 56 farms (89%, n= 50) spread farm
waste (manure, slurry, dirty water) onto land grazed by cattle.
Most farmers waited a set interval before returning stock to
grazing land spread with waste, with a median waiting time of 6
weeks (IQR 4–10). Few farms spread farm waste from other farms
(4%, n= 2).
Most of the 56 farms had watercourses running through them
(82%, n= 46); in the majority of cases these first crossed another
farm prior to passing through each farmer’s land (78%, n= 36).
Cattle had access to waterways on approximately one-third
(n = 13) of these 36 farms. Of the 22% of farmers (n = 10)
nominating that the watercourse originated on their premises,
80% (n= 8) did not let cattle have access to the watercourse. The
origin of a watercourse (on-farm or elsewhere) did not appear to be
associated with a farmer’s decision to allow cattle access to that
watercourse (Fishers Exact P = 0.5).
Preventing disease transmission within farms
Several questions were asked in relation to the prevention of
disease transmission between different animals or animal groups
within each farm. Of the 55 out of 56 farmers that housed animals,
75% (n= 41) always removed faecal material from pens before
moving animals from different management groups into the pen.
Just over half of the farmers (n = 31) responded that they routinely
cleaned and/or disinfected housing after mucking out.
Tractors that were used for multiple tasks on 42 out of 56 farms
(n= 50 tractors) appeared to be cleaned at varying frequencies.
Some were cleaned between tasks (n = 2), some were cleaned a
certain number of times per year (n = 19; median 4 times a year)
and some were cleaned at varying frequencies (n = 29), including
four that were infrequently, or never cleaned.
On only 7% of the 56 farms (n= 4) did farmers or their workers
carry out any personal biosecurity (i.e. cleaning boots, changing
overalls) between handling different management groups.
Discussion
This study was one of the first to investigate the biosecurity
measures undertaken by a sample of UK cattle farmers to reduce
the risk of pathogen transmission within and between farms. We
found considerable variation in how these measures were
performed. This reflects the limited literature currently available
that generally identifies that some farmers are undertaking little, or
infrequent, biosecurity. A recent survey in the UK highlighted that
34% of sampled farmers stated that biosecurity was ‘almost non-
existent’ on their farms [42]. This highlights the need for better
understanding of factors underpinning farmers’ decisions regard-
ing implementation of biosecurity practices.
It has been suggested that there is a ‘lack of or inadequacy of
public policy on biosecurity’ [43]. The current biosecurity
recommendations for cattle farmers from DEFRA emphasize
Figure 4. Number of farmers vaccinating animals against
various diseases on their arrival onto the farm from various
sources out of 56 farmers interviewed in a 100 km2 area of
north-west England.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028139.g004
Biosecurity on Cattle Farms in a Region
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minimization of disease transmission between premises via
contaminated clothing, vehicles and equipment [44], or specifi-
cally relate to FMD and other exotic diseases [45,46] or bTB
[47,48] and provides little guidance on preventing transmission of
endemic disease. The Scottish Agricultural College’s website has
more information relating to prevention of endemic diseases
(http://www.sac.ac.uk/research/themes/animalhealth/animal-
healthwelfare/biosecurity/) and goes as far as attempting to
determine risk levels of specific activities (http://www.sac.ac.
uk/research/themes/animalhealth/animalhealthwelfare/biose
curity/examples/). However, the available information re-
garding biosecurity may be of limited use to cattle producers
due to a lack of clarity, inappropriate detail and lack of
evidence of efficacy. Economic models have been constructed
to examine the cost of animal disease [8,49] but few or no
intervention trials have been carried out to look at the cost-
effectiveness of the recommended biosecurity practices.
Appropriate biosecurity is typically farm-specific and should be
based on the diseases which have the greatest impact or those that
the farm is at greatest risk of acquiring, where compliance is
achievable and is within the economic capabilities of the producer
[23,50,51]. Programs also need to be flexible in order to adapt to
individual situations [50,52]; this is important, as implementing
biosecurity measures that are not suitable may lead to them
becoming branded as ineffective or perceived as expensive and
time inefficient.
The farms in our study appeared to be representative of lowland
farming areas in the UK, with a typically higher average number
of dairy animals per herd than the average across the UK [41].
For areas where other types of cattle enterprise predominate, it is
possible that farmers would undertake practices differently,
however common contacts such as animal movements and visits
by companies and contractors and therefore associated risks are
likely to occur. Basic enterprise information on the non-
responding farmers appears to indicate that they are also typical
of farmers in this area, although the effect on the data created by
these non-responders is unknown.
Between farm biosecurity – direct contacts
The majority of farmers in the current study inquired about the
disease history of the vendor farm before purchasing stock.
However, further information about what producers did to acquire
and use such information was not collected; this should be
investigated in future studies as relying on the appearance of an
animal to indicate health status is risky [53]. In addition, the type
of stock purchased may have an effect on whether vendor farm
disease history is collected; this was not assessed in this study.
There is much information in the literature on diseases that can
be purportedly acquired via purchasing cattle; Bazeley [54]
contains an extensive list of these. Many farmers were concerned
about stock contracting BVD and leptospirosis, two of the most
common diseases in dairy herds in the UK [9]. Some producers
were worried about their animals contracting bTB; at the time this
study was conducted the north-west region of the UK was at
relatively low risk for bTB compared to other areas such as the
south-west of England and Wales (http://archive.defra.gov.uk/
corporate/about/who/cvo/documents/2005report.pdf). We were
initially surprised that two farmers nominated FMD as a particular
concern as the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK had been over for
more than 4 years by the time of this study. However there is a
growing body of evidence highlighting that this outbreak has had
lasting social and psychological effects with members of the
farming community experiencing substantial fear of another such
disaster occurring [55]. These points highlight the human
dimension of animal diseases and that thoughts and understanding
of one disease or disease related issue (e.g. biosecurity) should not
be viewed in isolation.
Quarantine of animals following arrival on a farm can be useful
in reducing disease transmission between herds [56]. It is of
concern that, despite recommendations from DEFRA, more than
50% of farmers in the current study did not isolate arriving stock
regardless of their origin. This is similar to the results of a study of
Irish farmers [57], but is much greater than reported for Swedish
farmers [36]. Recommendations on isolation period length are
somewhat unclear; DEFRA’s information for livestock keepers on
biosecurity only suggests that an isolation protocol be discussed
with a private veterinarian [44]. A single published source
recommends isolating animals for 21 days for diseases with short
incubation periods [15]. In the current study there was
considerable variation between the farms in terms of the duration
of isolation, and reflects the variation found in a Swedish study
[36]. In many cases, isolation length was also affected by the origin
of the animals.
The low percentage of farms performing health checks on stock
post-movement (9%) was the same as that seen in a previous study
involving dairy farms (9%) [35], although the percentage giving
routine treatments in the current study was much higher (between
60 and 70% for most movement types vs. 28% of farms). The
reported use of vaccination reflects the diseases reported
commonly by producers in this area (Brennan, unpublished data)
and mirrors the vaccines used by dairy farms in a study conducted
in Ireland [57].
Between-farm biosecurity – indirect contacts
Equipment contaminated with mucus, faeces and blood can
harbor infectious organisms and hence movement of equipment
between farms may also move pathogens [19]. For this reason, it is
recommended that borrowed or hired equipment be cleaned and
disinfected [19,44]. As identified in Brennan et al. [41], most
farmers who borrowed equipment cleaned and disinfected the
items prior to their return. This may suggest that the motivation
for this may be socially driven, for example as an act of courtesy,
rather than based on a perceived infection risk.
Transport vehicles can act as a transmission risk between farms
[58,59] and poor hygiene habits of companies and contractors
visiting farms may result in the transmission of infectious diseases
[60]. Non-farm vehicles should not be allowed on a farm unless
essential [25] and if they are absolutely necessary, they should be
clean and free of animal excreta [45]. The use of farm-owned
vehicles for moving animals may reduce transmission risk and was
commonly practiced in the study area. Transport by dealers may
pose additional risks as they may make several pick-ups from
multiple farms, potentially increasing the risk of infectious disease
transmission.
This study found that many companies and contractors failed to
undertake adequate biosecurity. As outlined in Brennan et al. [41],
deadstock collectors are often considered a high biosecurity risk
[37,60] as they are likely to have contact with diseased animals; in
this study they were nominated as cleaning and disinfecting
vehicles infrequently. Similarly, muck spreaders visited more than
half of the farms in the study area, yet reportedly cleaned and
disinfected their vehicles infrequently. This is of particular concern
considering the many diseases which can be transmitted via faeces
[61,62]. The lack of cleaning and disinfection of company and
contractor vehicles was mirrored with evidence of little effort
undertaken by company and contractor personnel to clean and
disinfect themselves. The exception to this was private veterinar-
ians, who reportedly cleaned and disinfected on the majority of
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farms. In a study by Noremark et al. [36], veterinarians were also
reported to almost always use protective clothing on farms.
Veterinarians should act as advisors regarding disease preventive
practices as they are often nominated as the preferred source of
information in relation to biosecurity [63,64] and hence their
behaviours may be highly influential.
Only 36% of farms had routine veterinary visits in this study.
This is similar to a study of UK beef producers where
approximately two-thirds of farmers had emergency only contact
with their veterinary surgeon [65]. This may indicate that dialogue
between many farmers and vets on general biosecurity and
preventive practices may be unlikely to occur. General advice
regarding preventive practices may be given during ad hoc visits but
constraints on time and resources means this may not occur. The
fact that the majority of farms are recording herd health
information is encouraging; records are important for monitoring
the success of herd health schemes, detecting emerging diseases
and are an important baseline for the development of preventive
programs [20,21,57].
In the UK, it is routine agricultural practice to remove manure
and slurry from housing and place it in a secondary store for up to
3–6 months prior to spreading it on fields [66,67] and such storage
should destroy most bacteria, although certain pathogens such as
Cryptosporidium parvum may require a longer time period due to their
resistant nature [68]. Most farmers in the UK either continually
remove slurry from sheds and place it in a secondary store, or
remove waste from sheds between April and May (after animals
have been moved outside). Spreading does not typically occur until
Autumn-Winter (,6 six months later) [66], therefore the risk of
pathogen transmission from waste spread on fields is probably
minimal, regardless of the length of time the fields have been left
before being grazed.
Wildlife contact is mentioned in the literature as a potential
source of pathogen transmission [13,69]. Wildlife contact was not
addressed here, or the measures producers undertook to prevent
this contact.
Within-farm biosecurity
There appears generally to be limited within-farm biosecurity
carried out on farms in this area. This is likely to increase the risk
for transmission of diseases among juvenile stock and older
animals [15]. For example, young stock housed in pens that were
scraped out and washed were half as likely to become infected with
C. parvum as those that had only bedding removed [70].
Personnel moving between different management groups
(including calves) within farms did not appear to undertake any
cleaning protocols or change their attire between handling
different management groups. In addition, tractors used for
multiple tasks on the farms were cleaned at varying time intervals,
sometimes infrequently. Therefore it is likely that the lack of
within-farm biosecurity on these farms would increase the risk of
transmission between different management groups. This may
result in the perpetuation of disease within stock [37], and may
create persistently infected adults by exposing young stock to
pathogens.
This study relied on farmers reporting on the behaviours of
visitors to the farm; as with most studies collecting information in
this way, it is possible that these may not be representative of what
visitors actually did.
Conclusion
This study has identified that producers and farm visitors
reportedly undertake biosecurity in a varied way, with some
undertaking little or no preventive measures to combat disease
transmission either within or between farms. Collecting baseline
data such as these is an important first step to understanding why
biosecurity is not undertaken more by individuals within the
farming industry.
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